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MORE ON RES GESTAE
ARTHUR BURKE*
of the Eleventh Judicial District Bar

In the July issue of Dicta 1952 appeared an article entitled
"Res Gestae in Colorado".' In this article res gestae wass classi-2
fied into three 3categories. They were "spontaneous declarations",
"verbal acts", and "contemporaneous acts". It was the latter
category which excited some comment and as a consequence is
worthy of further exploration.
Once again it is not the object of the writer to criticize the
Supreme Court of Colorado, but rather merely to inform the practitioner and student that this classification of res gestae does exist
and to attempt a clarification of the logic involved.
A partial exposition of the proposition that res gestae in Colorado involves a third element, which is a contemporaneous act,
is found in an article by Max Melville 4 in Dicta, July 1952. Mr.
Melville, however, confines the use of contemporaneous acts to sex
cases and in this he is not borne out by the cases.
This category of res gestae is, it is true, seemingly confined
to criminal cases. The logic behind this seems to be more that
these are the only situations in which there would be an objection to this type of evidence, rather than that the court has any
desire to restrict it. The objection made is that these contemporaneous acts are sometimes offenses themselves and knowledge
by the jury of their commission might unduly prejudice them
against the defendant in this trial. In most instances this is true.
Knowledge by the jury of some act, an offense in itself, committed while committing the offense with which the defendant is
charged, would prejudice the jury. Evidence of this act would
best be kept out. Why then, is it allowed? The answer to this
is fairly simple. Because, under certain circumstances, it would
be impossible for a witness to testify in regard to the act with
which the defendant is charged without at least a mention of a
contemporaneous act.
Take as an example the Garcia case.5 The defendant was on
trial for first degree murder. He had committed an assault upon
a person and when an arrest had been attempted had killed the
person arresting him. A witness attempting to relate the events
to the jury would find his story distorted and only a half truth
if not allowed to mention the assault which led to the arrest attempt. It is conceivable, in a similar situation, if this evidence
* Written while a student at University of Denver College of Law.

Dicta, July, 1952, "Res Gestae in Colorado" by Arthur Burke and Arthur
Frazin.
2 Which was admitted to be a part of the res gestae.
'Which, while criticized as such, are generally admitted to be a part of the
res gestae.
4Dicta, supra, p. 249, "Evidence as to Similar Offenses, Acts, or Transactions in Criminal Cases" by Max Melville.
IGarcia v. People, 59 Colo. 434, 149 P. 614 (1915).
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were excluded, for a jury furnished with only an half truth, to conceive of the arresting officer as committing an assault on the
defendant.
It is through practical necessity then that courts in their
search for the truth should admit such evidence.
Res gestae has been defined as "things done; transactions;
essential circumstances surrounding the subject. The circumstances, facts and declarations which grow out of the main fact
are contemporaneous with it and serve to illustrate its character." 6
Contemporaneous acts certainly fit this definition. Take once
again the Garcia case.7 The contemporaneous act of assaulting
the other person certainly grows out of the murder. That is, an
explanation for the officer's attempt to arrest Garcia is contained
in the explanation of the assault. The assault was contemporaneous with the murder. It had immediately preceded it. And it
served to illustrate its character. This is, a jury may have been
led to believe that the killing had an entirely different character
without knowledge of the assault and ensuing arrest attempt. It
is to be seen that a contemporaneous act fits the definition of
res gestae.
There are many who, admitting the necessity of admitting
this evidence and the proposition that spontaneous acts fit the
definition of res gestae, nevertheless maintain that it should be
isolated to save courts the possibility of confusion. They feel
that lumping spontaneous declarations, verbal acts, and contemporaneous acts into one rule of evidence and calling it res gestae
creates confusion. It is not the terming of all three as res gestae
which creates the confusion; it is the failure to distinguish the
logic underlying each."
This restriction of the res gestae rule has found no sympathy
in Colorado courts. As was said in Stahl v. Cooper,9 "The tendency
is to broaden, rather than restrict, the res gestae rule."
Colorado has made broad use of the spontaneous acts in res
gestae to help ascertain the facts of a case. There is only one
requirement, besides those generally accepted in res gestae, and
that is that the contemporaneous act be so interwoven with the
main act as to be a part of it. That is, that it would be impossible
to give a clear, honest opinion of what had happened without at
least allusion to the contemporaneous act.
In 1913 the Colorado Supreme Court defined res gestae in
such a way as to include contemporaneous acts. "Res gestae may
be defined as matter incidental to the main facts and explanatory
thereof, including acts and words so closely connected therewith
as to constitute a part of it; the circumstances, facts, and declarations, which spring out of the main fact, are contemporaneous
with it, and serve to illustrate its character." 10
Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed., p. 1539.

'Garcia v. People, supra.
S See Dicta, "Res Gestae in Colorado", supra.
Stahl v. Cooper, 117 Colo. 468, 190 P. 2d 891 (1948).
"OMartinez v. People, 55 Colo. 5, 132 P. 64 (1913).
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It is strictly a doctrine of necessity. If there is any way the
evidence desired can come in with this obviously prejudicial evidence being excluded, this will be done. When, however, the ends
of justice cannot be met without it, the evidence will be admitted.
A few cases will better serve to illustrate the character of a
contemporaneous act.
In Piela v. People 11 the defendant who was tried for assault
upon A had at the same time assaulted B. The court held evidence
of the assault on B as a part of the res gestae and admissible. As
can be seen, this evidence meets all the requirements enumerated
in Martinez v. People, supra. It also meets the requirement that
the evidence of the assault upon B, which is not the subject of
the trial, is so interwoven with the assault upon A that a witness could not describe the affray without a mention of it. Such
a result is not only logical but is justifiable. It would be unconscionable to fail in conviction in such a case merely because a
witness mentioned the assault upon B when describing the assault
upon A. This is, of course, the point upon which the entire question turns-is it possible to introduce the evidence of the assault
in question without alluding to the other assault? In this case it
was not and the evidence was properly admitted and labeled
res gestae.
This case is also an example of the court going beyond the
realm of sex cases as mentioned by Mr. Melville in his article supra.
The assault involved was not of a sexual nature.
Garcia v. People, supra, is another example of the court admitting evidence of a contemporaneous act in a case not involving
a sex offense. It too was labeled res gestae. " . . . evidence that
the defendant had committed an assault upon another and killed
the deceased while resisting arrest, was competent as a part of
the res gestae." The court may have erred in commenting upon
the competency because what should be questioned is the materiality or relevancy, but nevertheless, the meaning is clear and the
court had once again declared a contemporaneous act as a part of
the res gestae.
It seems in some cases that the evidence admitted as res
gestae might more properly be admitted as showing a scheme or
design. Such a case is Granato v. People 12 in which there was an
admission of evidence that defendant, who was prosecuted for
statutory rape, aided his companion, who allegedly raped another
girl, in removing her from the automobile. This case more properly seems to show design or scheme, but there is a thread running
through this case and all contemporaneous acts cases which is not
necessarily present in those in which a scheme or design is proved.
That thread is the element of the necessity of admitting this evidence to allow the proper evidence for a conviction of a guilty party.
Another case of this type is the case of Pearson v. People 13
Piela v. People, 6 Colo. 343 (1882).
'Granato v. People, 97 Colo. 303, 49 2d 431 (1935).
" Pearson v. People, 69 Colo. 76, 168 P. 655 (1917).
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in which it was held that the court properly admitted as part of
the res gestae, evidence of circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest, taking of arms from him, etc. It is not contended
here that the Colorado court has never been wrong in admitting
evidence as a contemporaneous act and part of the res gestae. If
the court has erred this would seem to be the case. This depends
on the circumstances of the case and, as in this case, it might
appear that perhaps the court erred in holding this to be a part
of the res gestae. If, however, it appears that the arrest and the
offense are closely connected, in point of time under the circumstances, then the arrest might actually be contemporaneous with
the act for which the defendant is indicted.
The thread running through all contemporaneous acts cases
is the thread of necessity. The necessity for admitting evidence
of another act or occurrence in order to receive evidence of the
4
main act. This is borne out quite clearly in Sarno v. People.1
In
this case evidence was admitted of different acts of the same kind
constituting several offenses and it was held that no error was
committed where it appeared that the acts were all a part of a
single transaction.
There is no reason for excluding evidence of this sort. But
there is one fact which must be kept in mind, which is that the
rule of necessity should govern such admissions. If the evidence
desired can be admitted without admitting statements concerning
contemporaneous acts this should be done. Where it is impossible
to separate the different acts then the evidence must come in.
An adequate safeguard against the prejudicial effects of the
admission can be obtained in the court's instructions to the jury
wherein he may warn them of the singleness of purpose of the
admission of this evidence.
Res gestae then, as seen in Colorado, is composed of three
categories. Undoubtedly spontaneous declarations and verbal acts
are still the most important of these three, but contemporaneous
acts should be recognized and accorded its place as a part of the
Colorado law on evidence. Such recognition, along with an understanding of the principles involved, will aid the attorney in the
preparation of his case and the court in its determination of these
questions of evidence.
BOOK TRADERS CORNER
County Judge George A. Wollbrinck of Lamar offers for sale
the furnishings of his law office and sets of American Jurisprudence, Nichol's Forms and the Colorado Statutes Annotated.
A complete set of the U. S. Reports may be purchased from
Petre and Zimmerman of Glenwood Springs, Colorado.
The 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated and many volumes of
the Restatements are offered for sale by Julius F. Seeman, 415
Symes Building in Denver.
4

Sarno v. People, 74 Colo. 528, 223 P. 41 (1924).
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INSTITUTES
One of the primary functions of any bar association is to
provide for the continuing education of its lawyer members. This
purpose is accomplished by the programs arranged by the Institute Committees of the Colorado Bar Association and of each local
bar association. In Denver there is also the Topical Luncheon
Committee of the Denver Bar Association which arranges discussion luncheons at which a limited number of attorneys are invited
to participate in a study of some very narrow field of law such
as the proper use of a particular legal form or the legal aspects
of some specific type of commercial transaction. The chairmen of
the Institute Committee and the Topical Luncheon Committee of
the Denver Bar Association request that readers of Dicta communicate to the Secretary of the Bar Association their desires as
to subjects for Institutes or Topical Luncheons. Such requests
are highly valued by your bar association as we are always anxious
to provide programs which are of interest to, or needed by the
largest number of our members.
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